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THE GOOD FIGHT:
THE EGOCENTRIC BIAS, THE AVERSION
TO COGNITIVE DISSONANCE, AND
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW
Daniel S. Medwed*
I. INTRODUCTION
The phrase “cognitive bias” often has negative connotations. It
is something to be overcome, thwarted, or, at best, circumvented.
In this essay, I suggest that two interrelated cognitive biases—the
egocentric bias and the aversion to cognitive dissonance—might
instead serve as potential assets for a criminal law practitioner in
persuading her constituencies. In Part II of this essay, I introduce
the basic concepts of the egocentric bias and the aversion to
cognitive dissonance. Next, in Part III, I demonstrate how these
cognitive biases relate to criminal law practice and can benefit
practitioners working in that field.
II. THE EGOCENTRIC BIAS
DISSONANCE

AND THE

AVERSION

TO

COGNITIVE

Mark Twain once noted that “[a] man cannot be comfortable
without his own approval.”1 This desire to be comfortable with
* Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law. I am thrilled to
participate in this symposium at Brooklyn Law School, the institution where I
launched my teaching career fifteen years ago. Although I have not taught legal
writing in many years, I believe it is the most important course in the first-year
curriculum. We often talk about teaching our students to “think like a lawyer.”
As far as I can tell, Legal Writing is the only part of the first year at most
schools where we teach them how to “be a lawyer.” Professors Marilyn Walter
and Betsy Fajans run one of the best Legal Writing Programs in the country, and
I am grateful to them for their advice and guidance when I first joined the
academy. I would also like to thank Chrisiant Bracken, a member of the Class of
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oneself can lead to a particular way of perceiving the world and
one’s relative importance in it. Indeed, cognitive psychologists
have recognized this condition, sometimes branding it the
“egocentric bias” or “self-serving bias.”2 This bias explains how
people tend to interpret information so as to promote a positive
self-image regardless of whether that image is warranted.3
The egocentric bias has various components to it. It tends to
spur people (1) to overestimate their importance and the
importance of the values they hold dear, (2) to think that others
share their same values and beliefs, and (3) to attribute good results
to their innate talents and bad results to external pressures.4
Moreover, this bias may lead people to interpret morally
ambiguous situations in ways that are consistent with their selfinterest as well as to overrate their own abilities.5 Although not
exclusive to any particular population, the egocentric bias appears
to be more pronounced in western, English-speaking cultures.6 It
also surfaces in a person’s behavior more often during interactions
with strangers than with friends,7 and especially when faced with
threatening situations.8
2014 at Northeastern University School of Law, for providing outstanding
research assistance.
1
See DANIEL S. MEDWED, PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO
CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT 38 n.27 (2012).
2
See id. at 210 n.27.
3
Id.; see also Lawton P. Cummings, Can an Ethical Person Be an Ethical
Prosecutor? A Social Cognitive Approach to Systemic Reform, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2139, 2142 (2010) (“Social cognitive research has demonstrated that
individual decision-makers are highly motivated to maintain moral self-image
and avoid self-sanctions.”).
4
See, e.g., Mamadi Corra, Self-Serving Bias, in THE CONCISE BLACKWELL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY 531, 531–32 (2011).
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See, e.g., Neal J. Roese & James M. Olson, Better, Stronger, Faster: SelfServing Judgment, Affect Regulation, and the Optimal Vigilance Hypothesis, 2
PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 124 (2007). As Roese and Olson explain,
Threats represent acute problems that demand quick
behavioral responses (e.g., predators require rapid avoidance),
because the cost of failure can be severe (e.g., death). In
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The egocentric bias resonates with everyday human
experience, manifesting itself to some extent within all of us. Take
these stock characters from the law school setting: the student who
fails an exam may chalk it up not to poor preparation,
comprehension, or execution, but to harsh grading by the
professor; the professor who receives horrid teaching evaluations
does not consider himself a weak communicator but rather a savant
too rigorous and demanding to be appreciated; and the dean whose
school plummets in the U.S. News & World Report rankings is the
victim of its dubious methodology rather than her own lackluster
leadership.
Do any of these characters sound familiar? Do any of them
sound delusional? Think about the old maxim that “99% of people
think they are of above-average intelligence.”9 It cannot be true for
everyone as a statistical matter, but thinking that you are “smarter”
than the mean sure makes you feel better. It serves a vital purpose
too. The egocentric bias helps to create a cognitive force field to
guard against life’s slings and arrows, a defense mechanism that
allows many of us to wake up in the morning and persevere.
Research indicates that self-serving judgments arguably enhance
“optimal vigilance” for people to protect them from genuine
threats.10
The egocentric bias is related to another concept known as the
“aversion to cognitive dissonance,” which is basically the other
side of the coin. Because people work hard to construct a positive
self-image, they tend to minimize any evidence that would dull the
shine from that image and create “cognitive dissonance,” that is, a
contrast, the behavioral implications of benefits are less
pressing (e.g., abundant food may be pursued at a leisurely
pace), partly because the cost of failure is less severe (e.g., it
takes longer to starve than to be eaten by a predator). Precisely
because of this brief temporal window in which responses to
threat must occur (e.g., fight or flight), an active mechanism is
needed to rapidly restore negative (but not positive) affective
shifts back to the set point.
Id. at 124.
9
See Corra, supra note 4 (discussing the “above-average effect”).
10
See Roese & Olson, supra note 8, at 124–25. See also Shelley E. Taylor
& Jonathon D. Brown, Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological
Perspective on Mental Health, 103 PSYCHOL. BULL. 193 (1988).
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cognitive collision between their glowing sense of self and
evidence that exposes their flaws.11 Let’s revisit the law school
setting for a moment. In order to forge a positive self-image, the
student who fails the exam may attribute his failure to unduly
tough grading. That same student may discount the fact that he
neglected to study at all for the exam because of an aversion to
cognitive dissonance—the potential recognition of his laziness
clashes with the student’s vision of his abilities. Therefore, that
fact is discounted or negated.12
III. CONNECTION TO CRIMINAL LAW
These concepts—the egocentric bias and the aversion to
cognitive dissonance—affect prosecutors and defense attorneys in
multiple ways. First, at the “big picture” level, the tendency to
maintain a positive self-image can shape how criminal law
practitioners view themselves and their adversaries. Second,
having carefully crafted a positive self-image, the confident lawyer
can now do her job on a “little picture” level; she can sell her case
during a series of pivotal moments throughout the criminal
litigation process.
A. Big Picture
The truth in criminal cases is often gray, not black-and-white.
Gray is ambiguous, confusing, and occasionally messy. And for
the overworked and often underpaid prosecutor or defense
attorney, grappling with the gray—the complicated, emotionally
charged facts and legal issues of each case—can be challenging.
That challenge is why constructing a strong sense of self that
validates, even idealizes, one’s role in the process is critically
important in order to simply get through the day.
Each criminal lawyer’s particular self-image varies
considerably, of course, but some general observations are worth
noting. Many prosecutors seem to view themselves as vigorous
11

See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 81 IND.
L.J. 481, 495–96 (2009).
12
Id.
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crime-fighters committed to protecting the victim and the public at
large—the cavalry in “white hats” going after the bad guys.13
Defense lawyers, for their part, may envision themselves as
guardians of the Constitution, the last line of security for the little
guy against the awesome power of the state, modern-day Davids
fending off aggressive Goliaths.14
Likewise, criminal lawyers might demonize the other side.15
This is natural. Such an intense, visceral area of the law evokes
passions, and with those passions, a dose of antipathy for
adversaries. As a young public defender in New York City, I was
shocked by the number of times my colleagues brought up World
War II imagery. Our hallway chit-chat was laden with references
to prosecutors as “Nazis” steamrolling over undeserving citizens
while public defenders toiled as undermanned guerilla warriors.
These admittedly simplistic images can lead to self-righteousness.
Sanctimonious lawyers caught up just as much in their own egos as
in the needs of their constituencies—the “people” for prosecutors
and the client for the defense lawyer—might not always see their
cases clearly. This lack of clarity can distort decision-making.16
13

In the words of Steven Stewart, the chief prosecutor in Clark County,
Indiana, “I have the best job a lawyer can have. Every day, I get to walk into
court wearing a white hat and fight on behalf of crime victims; to fight for
justice. There can be no better job than that.” Clark County Prosecutor Steven
Stewart, IND. PROSECUTING ATTYS. COUNCIL, http://www.in.gov/ipac/2950.htm
(last visited Sept. 27, 2013). See also MARK BAKER, D.A.: PROSECUTORS IN
THEIR OWN WORDS (1999); Cummings, supra note 3; Abbe Smith, Can You Be
a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355 (2001).
14
As one young public defender recently described the attributes of his job
on a university career center website, “if you are competitive, as I am, it is the
ultimate thrill. It is the classic David vs. Goliath: all the resources of the
government versus you and your client.” Jimmy Chu, U.C. Berkeley School of
Law, ‘10, UNIV. OF MICH. CAREER CTR., http://careercenter.umich.edu/article/
jimmy-chu-uc-berkeley-school-law-%E2%80%9810 (last visited Sept. 27,
2013).
15
See generally Abbe Smith, Are Prosecutors Born or Made?, 25 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 943 (2012) (discussing the demonization of defense lawyers but
also offering some harsh generalizations that many defenders believe about
prosecutors).
16
Zealous prosecutors might discount information pointing to the potential
post-conviction innocence of an inmate because such an idea—that they or their
offices prosecuted an innocent person—clashes with their positive self-image
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Yet, despite the hazards of self-righteousness and the
distortions caused by wearing rose-colored glasses, the mental
constructs generated by the egocentric bias and the aversion to
cognitive dissonance are essential to the criminal lawyer’s capacity
to overcome obstacles and perform effectively. These obstacles
may be very concrete—constraints of time and money, the stresses
of difficult clients and witnesses. Or they may be more abstract and
metaphysical. Why am I, hard-working prosecutor, devoting my
life to putting people behind bars? Why am I, diligent defender,
spending my days protecting the freedom of an often damaged and
dangerous client base?
We need good lawyers to serve as prosecutors and defenders
even though their career paths are littered with obstacles quite
different from those confronting attorneys in many other fields.
These obstacles include relatively low pay, high stress, and
potentially unwelcome attention for their work in the media. The
egocentric bias and the aversion to cognitive dissonance ensure
that good lawyers choose these paths and that at least some of them
stay the course over time, enabling them to tackle ever more
serious criminal cases. These biases not only create a cognitive
shell that protects against indignities, but also build a layer of
confidence and self-assurance that empowers lawyers to convince
others of the legitimacy of their position. This ability to “sell” a
case is a necessary component of a criminal lawyer’s work.
B. Little Picture
At bottom, criminal lawyers are salespeople. They must sell
their theory of a case to themselves, to their offices, to their
opponents, to juries, and to judges. Confident lawyers who
fundamentally believe in their theory of a particular case, and the
significance of their larger role in the system, will surely have
more success in making sales than those plagued by self-doubt and
and creates inordinate cognitive dissonance. See MEDWED, supra note 1, at 123–
46. See also Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to
Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125 (2004); Smith, supra
note 15, at 943–50 (presenting anecdotes about prosecutors that, according to the
author, display “smugness” as well as “self-importance, lack of imagination, and
cowardice”).
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indecision.17 The egocentric bias and the aversion to cognitive
dissonance can aid in the formation of just this sort of confidence,
undeserved as it occasionally may be. Let’s turn to four key “little
picture” moments in the criminal lawyer’s practice.
1. Developing a Theory of a Case
Lawyers are trained to review each case thoroughly and
critically, to probe and prod until they have mastered the facts.
Upon completion of that review, it makes sense to articulate a
theory of the case that captures its essence in a way that supports
the lawyer’s viewpoint. This will later prove helpful in pitching it
to other audiences; not incidentally, it may help the attorney to
rally around her own case and further her own commitment to the
cause. Narratives matter and the same set of “facts” can be told in
very different ways.
Take the following hypothetical. A plainclothes police officer
is patrolling a high-crime area known as a center of the local drug
trade. He notices a man standing on a corner with no apparent
purpose; the man is looking up and down the street and casting
furtive glances over his shoulder. The man is also wearing the
telltale colors of a gang reputed to sell large quantities of drugs.
Based on his experience, the officer knows that drug dealers in this
neighborhood are often armed. The officer believes that, even if he
lacks probable cause, he at least has reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity to justify a “Terry Stop” and conduct a protective
frisk to check for weapons.18
So, the officer approaches the man—and the man begins
walking in the opposite direction. A chase ensues. The officer
eventually tackles the man to the pavement; he then conducts a
17

Notably, too much confidence can be a hindrance. See, e.g., Adam M.
Grant, Rethinking the Extraverted Sales Ideal: The Ambivert Advantage, 24
PSYCHOL. SCI. 1024, 1028 (2013) (publishing study “showing that moderately
extraverted employees sell more productively than do employees who are low or
high in extraversion”).
18
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A “Terry Stop” refers to a brief
detention of a person by the police based on “reasonable suspicion” of criminal
activity but without the requisite probable cause to conduct a full search or make
an arrest. Id. at 37.
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quick pat-down frisk and feels a hard object in the man’s
waistband. The officer retrieves the object, which is not a weapon
but rather a solid packet (a “brick”) of heroin. The officer arrests
the man for drug possession.
I suspect that prosecutors and defense lawyers might have
divergent interpretations of these facts. To the prosecutor, this case
might be read as a narrative of bravery: a valiant undercover
officer taking a risk to clamp down on crime. But to the defense
lawyer, these facts tell something else: a story of an overzealous
police officer acting on a hunch and invading the personal space
(the waistband!) of a man who had done nothing suspicious
besides exercising his right to move freely on the streets of his city.
Constructing a powerful theory of a case, in many respects, is the
first pivotal advocacy moment in a criminal matter.
2. The Internal Sales Pitch
Many criminal lawyers work as part of an organization and
may not have unfettered autonomy in deciding how to proceed
with a case. They may have to convince others about the wisdom
of their choices from the get-go, including the decisions for
prosecutors about whether and what to charge. Some offices might
have charging review committees in which a group of lawyers
formally evaluates potential charges. Other offices might have
more informal intra-office processes for arriving at an agreeable
decision.19
Consider People v. Berry, a case from California involving a
dog that killed a young child in 1987.20 In that case, Michael Berry
owned several pit bulls, including one named “Willy” who was
bred for dogfighting.21 Although Berry secured Willy in his yard
with a six-foot chain, there was easy access to his property on one
side of his house.22 Berry shared a common driveway with a family

19

See MEDWED, supra note 1, at 21–29 (discussing charging review
committees).
20
See People v. Berry, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 416 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
21
Id. at 417.
22
Id. at 418.
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next door.23 One day, Willy killed the neighbors’ two-year-old
boy, who had strayed into Berry’s yard.24
A major issue in this case concerned what crime to charge: was
this manslaughter or murder?25 More specifically, were Berry’s
actions reckless (involuntary manslaughter) or extremely reckless
(second degree murder)?26 The assistant prosecutor who handled
the case has described how the charging decision occurred.27
Evidently, the prosecutor was not even a member of the homicide
unit at the time but was merely sitting in his office when he heard
several veteran prosecutors discussing the case down the hall.
Appalled by the facts of the case, and his curiosity piqued, he
walked over to his colleagues and said something to the effect of,
“Give me the file, and I’ll make it a murder.” And he did—he was
assigned the case and sought murder charges.28 The prosecutor’s
genuine indignation about a man housing a fighting dog next door
to a toddler, and his unbridled confidence in his assessment,
proved powerful in convincing more seasoned colleagues to entrust
the file with him.29 At trial, the court permitted the murder charge
to reach the jury, although Berry was ultimately convicted of
manslaughter.30

23

Id.
Id.
25
See Berry v. Superior Court, 256 Cal. Rptr. 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(evaluating whether the evidence sufficed to bind over for a second-degree
murder charge).
26
See id.
27
The prosecutor discusses this as part of a presentation to Professor Kate
Bloch’s criminal law class at the University of California at Hastings. A video
recording of this presentation is included as part of the course materials for
Professor Bloch’s casebook. See KATE E. BLOCH & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL,
CRIMINAL LAW: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH (2005) [hereinafter Berry
Video].
28
Id.; see also Berry v. Superior Court, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 351 (“We
conclude that it is for the jury to resolve the factual issues of probability of death
and subjective mental state. There is sufficient evidence to justify trial for
murder on an implied malice theory.”).
29
See Berry Video, supra note 27.
30
See Berry v. Superior Court, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 351; People v. Berry, 2
Cal. Rptr. at 417.
24
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3. The Plea Bargaining Bazaar
More than ninety-five percent of criminal cases are resolved
through guilty pleas.31 Indeed, there are strong practical incentives
to strike deals.32 Prosecutors face the uncertainty, time, and
expense of trial; defendants face uncertainty as well, plus the risk
of a harsher sentence if convicted after trial.33 There are potent
psychological incentives too. Lawyers, like most humans, are
prone to “loss aversion.”34 Simply put, they like to win and hate to
lose. For both sides, a plea can be framed as a certifiable “win”—a
conviction for a prosecutor and a good deal for the defense team—
without the vagaries of going to trial.
What, then, are the key factors in determining the outcome of a
particular plea negotiation? Some scholars ascribe to the “market
theory” of plea bargaining, in which they assert that both parties
barter under the shadow of trial, making offers and counter-offers
based on the perceived strength of their respective positions.35 But
case strength is only part of the equation; the individual lawyer’s
power of persuasion may prove essential in earning a desirable
plea bargain. The egocentric bias and the aversion to cognitive
dissonance can help in such efforts by giving attorneys the
confidence to sell their positions and extract concessions from the
other side.
4. Appearing in Court
When plea negotiations falter, criminal cases normally proceed
to the courtroom for a series of pretrial, trial, and appellate
skirmishes. During such encounters, attorneys’ powers of
persuasion are at a premium. Selling your theory of a case in court
requires knowing your audience and calibrating your pitch
accordingly. Trial judges may have different concerns than
appellate judges, for instance, and juries may be more partial to
31

See MEDWED, supra note 1, at 53.
To be sure, prosecutors might be reluctant to offer pleas, and defendants
reluctant to accept them, for a variety of reasons.
33
See MEDWED, supra note 1, at 52–68.
34
Id. at 56.
35
Id. at 60.
32
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particular types of narratives than to other accounts.36 As a result,
the skill set needed to excel in court is a multi-faceted one,
including the ability to communicate, emotional intelligence, and
poise. The connective tissue linking these skills is confidence. The
confident orator can summon the rhetorical passion required to
sway others to her position; the confident observer who can “read”
the audience and trust that assessment can better modify her
approach to appeal to that audience; and the confident person can
carry herself in a manner that commands respect.
Now, if confidence bleeds into arrogance, then all bets are off.
It is hard to influence people when they loathe you, not to mention
that an excessively confident person may be a poor listener or
otherwise overlook key social cues.37 But, as long as the egocentric
bias and the aversion to cognitive dissonance (a) generate
confidence and not arrogance, and (b) produce only a modicum of
self-righteousness, then they can be effective tools in the criminal
law practitioner’s courtroom tool-chest.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is often claimed that cognitive biases, such as the egocentric
bias and the aversion to cognitive dissonance, are troubling
features of the human condition. They can distort one’s perception
of reality and lead to poor decisions. However, these biases can be
effective advocacy and persuasion tools for the criminal law
practitioner operating in the trenches—in the vivid, gory, and gray
world of crime.

36

Scholars have long sought to analyze and unpack the mysteries of
judicial and jury decision-making, an undertaking that is far beyond the scope of
this brief essay. For an interesting and relatively recent discussion of judicial
decisionmaking, see Jill D. Weinberg & Laura Beth Nielsen, Examining
Empathy: Discrimination, Experience and Judicial Decisionmaking, 85 S. CAL.
L. REV. 313 (2012).
37
See generally Grant, supra note 17.

